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Executive Summary 
State officials face well-funded, well-organized coalitions of in-state businesses arguing 
for the prosecution of an out-of-state company––an unequal political contest. Accordingly, the 
state attorneys general (AGs) have resisted settlement attempts and have pushed both the 
Justice Department and the courts for stronger action against Microsoft. In the process, the 
interests of consumers––the AGs’ nominal clients––have been paid little more than lip service. 
The nine litigating states and the District of Columbia together account for just 27 
percent of the U. S. population. But they do represent many of Microsoft’s most vocal rivals. 
California is home to Apple, Palm, Oracle, Sun Microsystems, and Netscape. Massachusetts is 
home to the Lotus division of IBM as well as major operations of Sun and Oracle. Utah is 
home to Novell. 
By far, the most overreaching provision in the litigating states’ proposal is the 
prohibition on “binding” middleware code to Microsoft’s operating system software. In short, 
the litigating states would require Microsoft to allow licensees to remove the software code for 
any function that a Windows licensee could conceivably single out, while still requiring 
Microsoft to maintain the performance of the operating system. If Microsoft were able to 
comply technically––which is far from clear––it would have to rewrite Windows from scratch 
as a combination of thousands of separable, modular components.  
This would balkanize Windows as a platform for applications software. Developers 
would no longer be able to count on the presence of key segments of software code. Indeed, to 
ensure that their software worked properly, developers would have to provide those f eatures 
themselves. As a result, consumers would encounter different flavors of Windows with 
differing capabilities.  
Adding to Microsoft’s (and consumers’) woes, the litigating states would require 
Microsoft to license large amounts of its intellectual property to competitors for little or no 
compensation. Competitors would get Microsoft’s software code for free. But consumers 
would suffer in the long term from decreased innovation since Microsoft would be left with 
little incentive to develop Windows or many of its applications programs.  
 
 
   
 
     
 
The Litigating States’ Proposed Remedy For Microsoft 
Antitrust as a Substitute for Competition 
Robert W. Hahn
* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Many of Microsoft’s critics have derided the Revised Proposed Final Judgment put 
forth by the Department of Justice, nine of the original plaintiff states, and Microsoft as being 
too weak.
1 These critics say the remedy proposed by the remaining nine litigating states (plus 
the District of Columbia) would “restore” competition.  
But a close look at the states’ proposal leads to very different conclusions. I first 
examine the climate in which the antitrust proceedings are operating. Both theory and evidence 
suggest that what economists call “rent seeking”––the redistribution of property through non-
market activity––is firmly entrenched in the landscape. I then analyze key provisions of the 
litigating states’ remedy and find that the potential beneficiaries are Microsoft’s rivals, not 
software consumers. For example, the sweeping intellectual property disclosures mandated by 
the litigating states’ remedy would provide rivals with valuable proprietary information about 
Microsoft products at little to no cost. This would eliminate Microsoft’s incentives to develop 
new products and new features for existing products, to the long-term detriment of consumers. 
                                                 
* Mr. Hahn is director of the American Enterprise Institute-Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies, a 
resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute and a research associate at Harvard University. He also 
consults for Microsoft and other information technology companies. The views in this paper solely reflect those 
of the author. 
1 Elsewhere I analyze the settlement. See Robert W. Hahn, “United States v. Microsoft: The Benefits of Settling,” 
Related Publications 02-02, January 2002 (forthcoming in  Regulation). Available at 
http://www.aei.brookings.org/publications/related/settlement.pdf.  Here I focus strictly on the Plaintiff’s First 
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II.  THE LEGAL PROCESS AS A POLITICAL TOOL 
A. Political Motivations 
A substantial academic literature suggests that antitrust policymaking and enforcement 
often serve narrow private agendas, rather than broad public ends.
2 According to this research, 
politicians are responsive to lobbyists because lobbyists represent interests that are more 
focused––and thus pressed more keenly––than consumer interests. At work are relatively small 
coalitions of producers (as compared to, say, consumers nationwide) with a “strong community 
of interests [who] tend to have stronger political voices because each group member has a 
larger financial stake in the outcome…”
3 On the other side of the equation is the reality that any 
costs imposed on the nation as a whole will be widely spread––and therefore will not be as 
damaging to the politician as the cost of refusing to help the well-organized special interests.
4 
It is hardly surprising then, that Microsoft’s rivals have moved aggressively to influence 
both the prosecution of the case and the nature of the remedies imposed.
5 Many of Microsoft’s 
most ardent opponents have a great deal to gain by hobbling it with continual litigation and 
draconian remedies. State officials thus face well-funded, well-organized coalitions of in-state 
businesses arguing for the prosecution of an out-of-state company––an unequal political 
contest.
6 Accordingly, the state attorneys general have resisted settlement attempts and have 
                                                 
2 See, generally, the collection of articles in Fred S. McChesney and William F. Shughart II, eds., The Causes and 
Consequences of Antitrust, The Public-Choice Perspective, University of Chicago Press, 1995. See also, George 
J. Stigler, "The Theory of Economic Regulation", Bell Journal of Economics, 1971. 
3 William F. Shughart II, “Public-Choice Theory and Antitrust Policy,” in The Causes and Consequences, at 13. 
See also Mancur Olson,  The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups, Harvard 
University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1971. 
4 As Judge Richard Posner noted, due to geographic concentrations of companies within a state, the potential exists 
to exercise “a great deal of power to advance the interest of businesses located in [a Congressman’s] district 
however unimportant the interests may be from a national standpoint.” Richard Posner, “The Federal Trade 
Commission,” The University of Chicago Law Review 37, at 87. 
5 This is a natural, but unfortunate outcome of the incentives of the current system. In its early years, Microsoft 
paid little or no attention to politics. But, after years of antitrust accusations, the company has learned to play the 
game as well. 
6 The settling states are not immune to this type of pressure, either. Indeed, in all likelihood, the settling states 
chose to accept the settlement for equally parochial reasons. That explains in part why Judge Richard Posner 
argues that states should be excluded from federal antitrust actions. See Richard A. Posner, “Antitrust in the 
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pushed both the Justice Department and the courts for stronger action against Microsoft. In the 
process, the interests of consumers––the nominal clients of the attorneys general––have been 
paid little more than lip service.  
Microsoft’s competitors have been wielding the antitrust weapon for many years. At 
least as far back as 1993, Novell, a major producer of networking software, urged the Federal 
Trade Commission (FTC) to pursue an antitrust case against Microsoft.
7 And when the FTC 
decided to suspend its investigation, Novell, Lotus and WordPerfect lobbied the Department of 
Justice to pick up where the FTC left off.
8 More recently, Microsoft rivals have increased their 
visibility in Washington and dramatically increased their lobbying expenditures.
9 For example, 
in 1998, Sun underwrote the $3 million cost of a team of legal and economic experts given the 
task of persuading the Department of Justice to bring an antitrust case against Microsoft.
10 
Officials at the Justice Department have recently complained about this very process. 
Deborah Majoras, Deputy Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust, “decried what she called 
the ‘strategic use’ of antitrust suits by companies to hurt competitors.”
11 Majoras went on to 
note that one lobbyist for a Microsoft competitor “threatened that if I did not do as his client 
wished, I could count on the fact that I would never again get any more help in Silicon Valley 
in any investigation in the future.”
12  
California, which is home to many of Microsoft’s fiercest rivals, has seen especially 
aggressive lobbying on the part of Microsoft’s competitors. Indeed, the idea that it is the 
                                                 
7 “Novell has reportedly been quietly lobbying the FTC to act against Microsoft while also soliciting support in the 
industry for a class-action suit should the FTC fail to act.” Christopher Lindquist, “FTC Decides Not to Decide 
[Yet],” ComputerWorld, July 26, 1993, at 4. See also Julie Pitta, “Microsoft’s Dark Shadow,” Forbes, March 1, 
1993, at 106-107.  
8 Richard McKenzie, Trust on Trial, Cambridge: Perseus Publishing, 2000, at 197-198. 
9 John Heilemann, Pride Before the Fall, New York: HarperCollins, 2001, at 76. 
10 Heilemann, at 88-94. 
11 Mark Wigfield, “DOJ Atty Decries Companies’ Politicization of Antitrust,” Dow Jones News Service, February 
2, 2002. Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust Charles James echoed this concern: “Indeed, the number of 
requests for meetings with me immediately after my nomination but before my confirmation became so 
daunting that I adopted the posture of refusing to meet personally with any third parties in the Microsoft case…” 
Charles James, “The Real Microsoft Case and Settlement,” Antitrust vol. 16, no. 1, Fall 2001, at footnote 16. 
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government’s job to serve its corporate constituents is so ingrained that elected officials don’t 
go through the trouble of concealing their complicity. A story published shortly after California 
and several other states decided not to accept the settlement reported that California Attorney 
General Lockyer said “his resolve was hardened after listening over the weekend to advice 
from technical experts and officials from Microsoft’s competitors, such as IBM, AOL Time 
Warner Inc., Sun Microsystems Inc. and Novell Inc.”
13 The State of California has 
subsequently taken the lead in the continuing litigation, in particular by providing funding. As 
one press account confirmed, “ Microsoft's competitors lobbied California lawmakers and 
Governor Gray Davis to approve the extra $3.7 million for antitrust enforcement…”
14  
These same competitors have also actively opposed the settlement by filing comments 
in the Tunney Act proceedings in which the judge is required to weigh the merits of antitrust 
settlements in terms of the broader public interest. AOL, Novell, Palm, RealNetworks, SBC 
and Sun Microsystems have all filed Tunney Act comments.
15 Trade groups supported by many 
of Microsoft’s biggest rivals have also actively opposed the settlement and filed motions asking 
for permission to participate in the hearings.
16 In particular, the Computer and Communications 
Industry Association (CCIA) and the Project to Promote Competition & Innovation in the 
Digital Age (ProComp) have been busy beating the war drums.
17  
                                                 
13 Ted Bridis, “Many of 18 states prepare to reject antitrust settlement with Microsoft,”  Associated Press, 
November 6, 2001. See also Mary Ann Ostrom, “California attorney general takes high profile against 
Microsoft,” San Jose Mercury News, November 7, 2001. 
14 Ted Bridis, “States Vow to Fight Microsoft,” Associated Press, November 9, 2001. 
15 The U.S. Department of Justice has posted “major” comments on the proposed settlement; links for these are 
provided at  http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/ms-major.htm . Direct competitors submitting “major” comments 
include: AOL Time Warner, Red Hat, RealNetworks, SBC, Novell, Palm and Sun Microsystems.  
16 Trade associations supportive of Microsoft, such as the Association for Competitive Technology (ACT), filed 
comments as well. See http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/ms_tuncom/major/mtc-00027806.htm.  
17 “ CCIA Seeks to Intervene in Microsoft Settlement Hearing,” Computer & Communications Industry 
Association, February 8, 2002, available at http://www.ccianet.org/press/02/0208.php3; “ProComp Files Motion 
Asking to Participate in Tunney Act Proceedings,” Project to Promote Competition & Innovation in the Digital 
Age (ProComp), February 8, 2002, available at  http://www.procompetition.org/headlines/020802.html. 
Computer & Communications Industry Association (CCIA), another lobbying association that receives major 
funding from Microsoft competitors including Sun and Oracle, also filed a comment. See “Comments of 
Computer & Communications Industry Association on the Revised Proposed Final Judgment,” Computer & 
Communications Industry Association, January 28, 2002 available at 
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B.  Private Uses 
Companies do not restrict their rent-seeking behavior to the political arena. Private 
lawsuits, or even just the threat of them, can be used as bargaining chips in business 
negotiations. For example, America Online (AOL) recently filed a lawsuit against Microsoft for 
alleged damages resulting from the actions Microsoft took against Netscape (later acquired by 
AOL for $10 billion) that were found to be anticompetitive by the courts. As a Wall Street 
Journal article observed, “The Netscape lawsuit is just the latest move in a bigger chess match 
between AOL and Microsoft.”
18 AOL is the world’s largest Internet access provider and has an 
extensive proprietary online network that competes directly with Microsoft’s MSN Internet 
service. “AOL had been holding out the prospect of a lawsuit as a threat against Microsoft as 
the two companies negotiated last spring,” the Journal story noted.
19  
III.  THE  LITIGATING  STATES’ P ROPOSED  REMEDY––TAILORED FOR 
MICROSOFT’S COMPETITORS 
The litigating states represent the powerful rivals of Microsoft with major operations 
within the states’ boundaries. And by no coincidence, their proposal neatly dovetails with the 
business needs of Microsoft’s competitors.  
                                                                                                                                                           
Promote Competition & Innovation in the Digital Age (ProComp), January 28, 2002, available at 
http://www.procompetition.org/headlines/012802.pdf. Progress & Freedom Foundation, a think-tank that 
receives funding from ( among others) Sun, Novell, Oracle, IBM, and SBC filed a comment as well; see 
http://www.pff.org/supporters.htm.   
18 Julia Angwin and Jared Sandberg, “Lawsuit Against Microsoft Is Netscape’s Biggest Asset,” The Wall Street 
Journal Online, January 24, 2002. 
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A. A Profile of the Litigating States 
The Department of Justice, which represents all Americans, along with nine states have 
chosen to settle the case.
20 Two other states dropped out of the litigation or settled earlier.
21 
Another thirty never participated in the litigation at all. Meanwhile, the nine litigating states
22 
and the District of Columbia together account for just 27 percent of the United States’ 
population.
23  
But the litigating states do represent many of Microsoft’s most vocal rivals. California 
is home to Apple, Palm, Oracle, Sun Microsystems, and Netscape (although Netscape is now 
part of AOL Time Warner, based in New York). Massachusetts is home to the Lotus division of 
IBM as well as major operations of Sun and Oracle. Utah is home to Novell. 
B.  How the Litigating States’ Proposed Remedy Benefits Microsoft’s Rivals  
While much of the litigating states’ remedy appears to be designed for the benefit of 
Microsoft’s most ardent competitors without regard to the impact on consumers, I focus on a 
handful of particularly egregious requirements. 
1.  A Windowless World 
By far, the most overreaching provision in the litigating states’ proposal is the 
prohibition on the “binding” of “middleware” code to Microsoft’s operating system software.
24 
                                                 
20 The nine settling states are New York, Ohio, Illinois, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan, North 
Carolina, and Wisconsin. Of course, these states do no better at representing national interests than the litigating 
states. They are likely to have their own parochial reasons for settling.  
21 Two other states were party to the initial complaint, but South Carolina withdrew from the suit in December 
1998 after AOL announced that it was purchasing Netscape and New Mexico reached an independent settlement 
with Microsoft in July 2001. 
22 The nine litigating states are California, Connecticut, Florida, Iowa, Kansas, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Utah, 
and West Virginia. The District of Columbia joined these states in pursuing litigation. 
23 U.S. Census Bureau, Census 2000 Redistricting Data (P.L. 94-171) Summary File. All but two of the litigating 
states, Kansas and Utah, have Democratic attorneys general; see National Association of Attorneys General, 
available at http://www.naag.org/ag/full_ag_table.cfm. 
24 Plaintiff’s First Amended Proposed Final Judgment (referred to as Plaintiff’s proposal henceforth), at 2. I rely on 
the litigating states’ definition of the term “middleware” (as well their definitions for other products, such as 
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In short, the litigating states would require Microsoft to allow licensees to remove the software 
code for any middleware they could conceivably single out, while still requiring Microsoft to 
maintain the performance of the operating system. Because the litigating states define 
middleware to include almost all kinds of software,
25 this provision would go well beyond 
including Add/Remove buttons for the limited middleware at issue in the trial and would 
require a complete redesign of Windows. If Microsoft were able to comply technically, which 
is unclear, it would have to rewrite the Windows operating system from scratch as a 
combination of thousands of separable, modular components.
26 Licensees could then offer 
various versions of “Windows” by excluding different combinations of these modules at will.
27  
Licensees could potentially offer hundreds, if not thousands, of versions of Microsoft’s 
PC operating system, each with a different combination of “middleware” excluded but all 
marketed as “Windows.”
28 This would fragment the Windows platform. Developers would no 
longer be able to count on the presence of key segments of software code (application 
programming interfaces, or APIs) used by their programs. Indeed, to ensure that their software 
                                                 
25 The litigating states’ definition of middleware is quite broad, covering “without limitation Internet browsers, 
network operating systems, e -mail client software, media creation, delivery and playback software, instant 
messaging software, voice recognition software, digital imaging software, the Java Virtual Machine, calendaring 
systems, Handheld Computing Device synchronization software, directories, and directory services and 
management software.” Plaintiff’s proposal, at 24. 
26 Designing any modern operating system with millions of lines of code, let alone a new modular operating 
system, is extremely difficult and costly to do. It certainly could not be done in the six months allowed by the 
litigating states, and could conceivably take years to accomplish––even starting from the current Windows code. 
The resulting modular operating system would likely contain a great deal of redundant code since each module 
would have to be self-sufficient and completely removable. The litigating states do allow for an extension to the 
6-month timeframe, but would require their decree be extended by the same increment. If Microsoft required 
five years to redesign Windows, the litigating states remedy would have to be administered for 15 years.  
27 In addition to OEMs, all licensing, contract and negotiation rules would apply to “third-party licensees” offering 
to purchase and redistribute at least 10,000 licenses for a product or combination of products. This would 
include individuals, independent software vendors (ISVs), systems integrators, and value-added resellers. 
Therefore, any licensee ordering the minimum 10,000 copies would be able to dictate what middleware had to 
be removed from Windows. Plaintiff’s proposal, at 26. 
28 Every one of these different versions of Windows could be marketed as “Windows” without distinguishing what 
pieces of code were missing. If a total of n middleware products were defined, then 2
n different versions of 
Windows could potentially be offered. Given the litigating states’ remedy’s expansive definition of 
“middleware,”  n could range from roughly 10 (interpreting the definitions narrowly) to thousands (treating 
every Windows API as a separate piece of “middleware”). For n=10, the required number of Windows versions 
(for each of Windows Me, Windows 2000 Professional, Windows XP Home, and Windows XP Professional) 
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worked properly, developers would have to provide those features themselves (raising their 
own costs). Alternatively, developers could obtain the source code supporting those APIs and 
distribute it separately for consumers to install as needed. As a result, consumers would 
encounter different flavors of Windows with differing capabilities.  
The ensuing confusion would surely increase support costs for Microsoft, other 
software developers, and computer manufacturers. Added to every support call would be 
numerous questions to determine which version of Windows was installed on the computer. 
Thus, the litigating states’ provision would allow rivals to impose high costs on Microsoft
29––
with software developers and consumers absorbing the collateral damage.  
The litigating states’ remedy would also micromanage Microsoft’s pricing decisions in 
an unprecedented way. Each less-than-full version of Windows would have to be licensed at a 
reduced price, where the discount was determined by the relative “development costs” of the 
omitted Microsoft middleware.
30 If a Microsoft programmer had a flash of inspiration and 
invented valuable new middleware for Windows in just a few days, Microsoft’s discount for 
omitting that middleware would be negligible. If another feature, less valuable to consumers 
but still deemed worthy of investment, took months to develop, its discount would be much 
higher. The remedy would require that discounts be based on the cost of inputs alone––and 
would thus not be influenced by market demand, which ordinarily leads market prices to reflect 
value to consumers. 
Ignore for a moment, however, the lack of economic foundation for the litigating states’ 
pricing provision and consider how difficult it would be to implement. Design teams often 
develop software components simultaneously, making it impossible to calculate discrete 
                                                 
29 A competitor, such as Sun, could license 10,000 copies of Windows for “internal use” in order to mandate that 
obscure pieces of middleware were removable from the operating system. At trial, a number of different prices 
were used as “representative” of the price of Windows to OEMs. At an average price of $65, Sun or other 
Microsoft competitors could force Microsoft to incur many millions (perhaps billions) of dollars in development 
and testing costs––all for an outlay of less than $1,000,000. As noted above, Sun spent three times that amount 
in convincing the DOJ to bring charges against Microsoft. This illustrates competitors’ willingness to incur costs 
in order to raise Microsoft’s expenses.  
30 The maximum total discount would be 25 percent, unless Microsoft offered the middleware for sale separately, 
such as for use by customers who obtain a version of Windows that omits it. In that case, the discount would be 
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development costs for individual components. The costs necessarily would be allocated in an 
arbitrary manner––with each licensee arguing that more costs be allocated to the functions it 
wanted to exclude.  
It is easy to imagine cases where the pricing provision would prevent Microsoft from 
competing. Any new feature or enhancement could be defined as middleware and thus would 
fall under the provision. For example, the version of Windows containing Windows Messenger 
would have to be priced higher than the base version. But AOL could still give away its 
competing Instant Messenger, the leading instant messaging software. Similarly, Microsoft 
would have to charge extra if Media Player were included with Windows, but RealNetworks 
could continue to  give away versions of its RealPlayer in order to maintain its market 
leadership. 
In the highly competitive market for software that runs server networks, which is also 
covered by the litigating states’ proposed remedy, Microsoft would be forced to charge 
separately for the networking components of the “client” operating systems on computers 
accessing the network. Novell and Sun, by contrast, would remain free to provide client 
computer software that connected to their server software at prices that undercut the formulaic 
prices Microsoft had to charge.  
In fact, if Microsoft anticipates a competitor offering a new piece of middleware 
(network-based or PC-based), Microsoft would have no incentive to develop it because the 
company likely would be at a competitive disadvantage in product pricing. As a result, the 
litigating states’ pricing provision would weaken the competition that market leaders AOL, 
Sun, and RealNetworks face from Microsoft, giving them greater discretion to raise prices to 
consumers.  
Thus,  any reasonable reading of the binding and pricing provisions leads to the 
conclusion that the litigating states’ remedy would mean less competition––and considerable 
harm to consumers. First, it seems unlikely that Microsoft could comply with the provisions 
within the allotted six months. Even if it could, the provisions remove Microsoft’s incentives to 
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competitive prices. Consumers could easily encounter higher prices since competitors would 
face decreased price pressure from Microsoft.
31   
2.  Intellectual Property Giveaways  
Adding to Microsoft’s (and consumers’) woes, the litigating states would require 
Microsoft to license large amounts of valuable intellectual property (IP) to competitors for little 
or no compensation.
32 Competitors would get Microsoft’s software code for free, but 
consumers would suffer in the long term from decreased innovation since Microsoft would be 
left with little incentive to develop Windows or many of its applications programs. 
Under the litigating states’ proposed remedy, Microsoft would have to auction the right 
to adapt its Office business applications suite to non-Windows operating systems in exchange 
for one-time payments.
33 The auction winners would not incur any of the original development 
costs associated with creating and enhancing Office; they would face only the costs of adapting 
the software to a new platform, such as Linux. As a result, they could profitably license the new 
Office suite for bargain prices. Moreover, since the auction winners could face stiff competition 
among themselves, the auction prices paid to Microsoft would likely be modest. Microsoft 
would also lose a distinguishing feature for the Windows platform. All of this would make it 
highly unlikely that Microsoft received full compensation for its intellectual property or lost 
sales of Windows. 
                                                 
31 Plaintiff states might argue that new or existing competitors would step in to replace Microsoft, but this process 
would take considerable time and involve significant transition costs. And there would be no guarantee that 
consumers would pay lower prices in the end. 
32 This paper covers just a few examples of the IP giveaway requirements in the litigating states’ remedy. Still 
another provision calls for Microsoft to license “all intellectual property rights … that are required to exercise 
any of the options or alternatives provided or available to them under this Final Judgment.” Plaintiff’s proposal, 
at 11. Plus Microsoft would have to disclose “all APIs, Technical Information and Communications Interfaces” 
needed to permit rival middleware to achieve “interoperability” with Microsoft software. Plaintiff’s proposal, at 
6. Microsoft would also have to allow “qualified representatives of OEMs, ISVs, IHVs [independent hardware 
vendors], IAPs, ICPs [Internet content providers], and Third-Party Licensees” to “study, interrogate and interact 
with the source code and any related documentation and testing suites of Microsoft Platform Software.” 
Plaintiff’s proposal, at 7. Microsoft Platform Software is defined as operating systems and middleware, so it 
would seem to encompass all of Microsoft’s major products. 
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As part of this mandate, Microsoft would have to provide all relevant source code for 
both the Macintosh and Windows versions of Office (which are different products based on 
unrelated source code) as well as “all parts of the source code of the Windows Operating 
System Product necessary for the porting.”
34 Any new versions of Office, plus all new 
“necessary” Windows source code, would also have to be passed on to the auction winners, for 
no additional charge. So, in addition to not receiving full compensation for past Office 
development efforts, Microsoft would receive no compensation for ongoing development 
efforts. 
Yet another provision of the litigating states’ proposal would require Microsoft to 
release its browsers (Internet Explorer and MSN Explorer) under “open source” licenses.
35 That 
is, Microsoft would have to release all of the browser source code to the general public (not just 
to three auction winners as with Office) for use, modification and redistribution. And it would 
have to do so for free.  
Thus, under the litigating states’ remedy, Microsoft’s competitors stand to gain a great 
deal of intellectual property at little to n o cost. Any rival wishing to clone Windows or to 
improve another operating system could cherry-pick the technology included in Internet 
Explorer (IE) and MSN Explorer. Sun Microsystems could use the disclosure provisions to gain 
access to everything it needed to copy key Windows features for its server operating system, 
Solaris. Oracle, IBM and Novell, all of which compete with Microsoft in email software, would 
be in the same enviable position. They could learn how Microsoft’s email software, the MS 
Exchange Server, replicates and communicates, significantly lowering the costs of cloning 
Exchange. The result would be a grand-scale expropriation of Microsoft’s intellectual property. 
                                                 
34 Plaintiff’s proposal, at 11. 
35 Plaintiff’s proposal, at 9. Along with the requirement to give away source code, Microsoft would also have to 
expend resources to assist competitors in understanding the source code with the goal of modifying it. Even 
ardent supporters of open-source software find fault with this provision. For example, Lawrence Lessig,  a 
professor at Stanford Law School writes: “While I am a strong supporter of the free and open source software 
movements …I am not convinced the requirement of open sourcing Internet Explorer is yet required, or even 
effective.”  Lessig argues that the DOJ settlement already has “a strong requirement that application interfaces 
be disclosed, and until that remedy proves incomplete, I don’t believe the much more extreme requirement of 
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The intellectual property freebies would be even more helpful to competitors in 
combination with the binding and pricing provisions. Consider that Microsoft would have to 
give away its browsers as open source software. At the same time, Microsoft would have to 
charge a higher price for any version of Windows containing IE, as compared to the versions 
without it. Because they could not guarantee its presence, Microsoft could not even tout IE as a 
feature that enhanced Windows. On the other hand, AOL would remain free to pay computer 
makers not to install any Microsoft browser software (IE or MSN Explorer) and to feature the 
AOL browser (a customized version of IE). By knocking Microsoft out as a competitor in this 
fashion, AOL could more easily maintain its dominance in Internet access and instant 
messaging. Under these circumstances, few computer makers would distribute Internet 
Explorer and none would ever pay for it.  
In fact, virtually all of the IP disclosure rules proposed by the litigating states are 
designed in a way that guarantees Microsoft could not recoup the value of past R&D 
investments through licensing. To name a just few such examples: IE and MSN Explorer would 
be provided for free; the Office auction would only allow for a one-time payment with no 
ongoing royalties; all new Office enhancements would be given to the auction winners for free; 
large amounts of Windows source code would be shown to competitors for free. The initial 
effect of disclosing an innovation after it has been developed is necessarily positive for 
consumers, who need not compensate the innovator to get the benefit. But the long-term effects 
are decidedly negative: knowing that it will not retain the rights to the IP it develops and will 
not receive compensation for the expropriation, a firm has no incentive to invest in further 
development.   
The end-result of the litigating states’ proposal, then, would be the elimination of 
Microsoft’s incentives to invest in software development. Giving away the source code would 
kill further improvement in Microsoft’s browsers. Licensing Office for fire-sale prices and 
providing all later Office enhancements for free would erase any incentive to continue 
                                                                                                                                                           
before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary at its hearing: The Microsoft Settlement: A Look to the Future, 
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developing Office. Opening Windows source code to competitors would destroy Microsoft’s 
incentives to improve its operating system.  
In each case, consumers would suffer in the long run. IE and MSN Explorer would 
languish; Windows would stagnate. Overall innovation by competitors might be reduced as 
well, since they would no longer face competitive pressure from Microsoft.  
3.  Other Gifts for Microsoft’s Competitors 
The prohibition on software “binding,” the pricing limitations divorced from any 
economic principle, and the free-for-competitors intellectual property disclosure rules stand out 
as blatant attempts to help Microsoft’s rivals at the company’s expense. A couple of other 
provisions, minor only by comparison, warrant mentioning because they are so obviously 
aimed at rent seeking. 
a.  A Sun Monopoly in Java 
Microsoft would be required to distribute, free of charge, a version of the “Java runtime 
environment” that is “compliant with the latest Sun Microsystems Technologies Compatibility 
Kit” with each and every copy of Windows and IE.
36 Note that, as part of the settlement for an 
earlier suit brought by Sun, Microsoft had already agreed to cease developing its own version 
of Java and eventually to stop distributing its version altogether.
37 Sun would be the sole 
beneficiary, gaining wide distribution of its own version of Java.
38 The result would be 
government-mandated control of this form of middleware for Sun. 
Consumers, however, would gain nothing. Computer manufacturers are already at 
liberty to contract with Sun or any other supplier to install any Java runtime environment they 
or their customers desire. And Java is widely available through free Internet downloads.   
                                                 
36 Plaintiff’s proposal, at 10. 
37 Settlement Agreement and Mutual Limited Release, Sun Microsystems v. Microsoft, No. C 97-20884 RMW, 
January 2001, available at www.microsoft.com/presspass/java/01-23settlement.asp. 
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b.  An Invitation to Litigate 
As a final example of naked rent seeking, consider how enforcement would work in the 
litigating states’ plan. The remedy calls for a court-appointed Special Master who would have 
“access to all information, personnel, systems, equipment, premises and facilities” deemed 
“relevant.” Microsoft competitors could use the fruits of these unlimited searches in formal 
hearings and investigations, which is likely to lead to a steady stream of filings. What is more, 
third-party complainants would be allowed to remain anonymous, making it almost costless for 
competitors to flood the regulator with complaints.
39  
Any number of Microsoft rivals would benefit from this provision because of its 
potential to raise Microsoft’s costs. Consumers, however, could suffer as Microsoft was forced 
to divert resources from product development and support in order to fend off new charges.  
IV.  CONCLUSIONS 
This analysis highlights numerous examples in which Microsoft’s competitors, not 
competition itself, would benefit from the litigating states’ proposed remedy. In addition to 
handing rivals large amounts of Microsoft’s intellectual property for little or no compensation 
and increasing Microsoft’s costs of doing business, the most egregious provisions would render 
ongoing development of Windows unprofitable. Rather than “restoring” competition, the 
litigating states’ proposal amounts to a classic exercise in rent seeking: Microsoft’s competitors 
are attempting to use the antitrust process to further their own interests at Microsoft’s expense, 
with consumers bearing much of the cost.  
                                                 
39 Nor would the charges have to have any real merit, as the Special Master would have only two weeks to 
determine whether to investigate. 